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What constitutes the essential formulation (ikar) of a neder, and is chatfasa (comparison to a korban) a second dimension or merely an explanation? The Ran and Beis Yosef hold chatfasa is only a synonym for "asur," explaining why one who says "davar zeh asur alai ki imo" remains permitted—the explanation fails, so the entire neder fails. This approach challenges the Maram Chaviv's ruling and reconciles multiple Rishonim.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of Nedarim 2b, focusing on the fundamental question of what constitutes ikar haneder (the essential formulation of a vow) and the nature of chatfasa (comparing something to a korban or prohibited item). The discussion centers on a debate between different approaches to understanding how nedarim work. The shiur begins with the Tur's language describing ikar haneder. The Tur states that one can create a neder either by saying "kikar zeh alai kikarbon" (this loaf is to me like a korban) or by saying "davar zeh asur alai" (this thing is forbidden to me), and both are considered ikar haneder. The Beis Yosef challenges the Tur's use of the word "nami" (also), arguing that the lashon is imprecise. The Beis Yosef maintains that the true ikar haneder is "davar zeh asur alai," while "kikar zeh alai kikarbon" is also ikar but not the "prime" ikar. His proof: when one is matfis (makes a comparison), one must be matfis bedovar hanoder (using the language of the thing being prohibited), not bedovar ha'asur (using prohibited language).
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Nedarim 2b
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