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Must a husband orally declare "this is your get" when handing his wife a divorce document, or is physical delivery enough? The shiur analyzes Rambam (רמב"ם)'s two-part formulation: one halacha (הלכה) requires kinyan (acquisition through reshus), another requires amira (verbal declaration). The Mishna's cases—misleading her, partial mesira, and sleeping—test whether she qualifies as a bas gerushin at the moment of delivery.
This shiur examines the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s treatment of get delivery in Hilchos Gerushin, Perek 5, Halacha (הלכה) 8, focusing on two separate halachos that govern when a get is valid. The first halacha concerns kinyan—whether the wife acquires the get through being kona b'chatzera (acquisition via one's domain) when the husband is not makpid (particular) about the exact location. The second halacha addresses reshus—whether a certain space, such as her bed (mitah), is considered her own domain such that placing the get there constitutes valid delivery (nasan b'yada). The Rambam distinguishes between keili shelo kana (acquiring through a vessel that doesn't belong to her but is in the husband's domain) and reshus shelo kana (a domain that doesn't belong to her but is considered hers for purposes of get). The shiur argues these are fundamentally different dinim: keili shelo is a din in hilchos kinyanim (laws of acquisition), while mitah is a din that certain spaces are halachically considered "her hand" (yada) even without kinyan. This distinction matters for other areas of halacha—what applies in one context (such as acquiring peiros through a basket in Bava Metzia) may not apply in another.
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Gittin 78a
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