No community start suggestion yet.
Does a get require ksav lishmah (writing for the sake of the specific woman)? The shiur analyzes a Tosafos (תוספות) challenging whether Rabbi Meir's position in the Mishna provides proof that ksav lishmah is not required, exploring the relationship between witness signatures (eidei chasimah) and witnesses to delivery (eidei mesirah), and distinguishing between requirements for a valid divorce versus requirements for a valid legal document (shtar).
This shiur presents a detailed analysis of Gittin 3b, focusing on a Tosafos (תוספות) that questions the Gemara (גמרא)'s proof regarding ksav lishmah. The central issue is whether a get must be written lishmah (for the sake of the specific woman being divorced) according to Rabbi Meir, and what the Mishna's discussion of various invalid gittin tells us about this requirement. The Gemara attempts to prove from Rabbi Meir that ksav lishmah is not required. This proof is based on understanding what Rabbi Meir means when he discusses a get written "mechubar" (attached to the ground) versus "talush" (detached). According to one interpretation, if the get was written mechubar and signed talush, it is valid according to Rabbi Meir, which would prove that ksav lishmah is not required.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Gittin 3b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
