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If Bnei Yisrael already accepted the Torah (תורה) with Na'aseh V'nishma, why did Hashem (ה׳) then coerce them by holding Mount Sinai overhead? The Ran explains that voluntary acceptance would make Torah optional, but Torah must be imposed as an existential necessity. Kofel et hahar established that the world's very existence depends on Torah's presence, not on human choice.
This shiur examines the classic question posed by Tosafos (תוספות) on Gemara (גמרא) Shabbos (שבת) regarding the apparent contradiction between Bnei Yisrael's voluntary acceptance of the Torah (תורה) with "Na'aseh V'nishma" and Hashem (ה׳)'s subsequent forcing them to accept it by holding Mount Sinai over their heads (kofel et hahar kegigas). The lecturer begins by questioning what exactly Hashem was demanding when He threatened them with burial under the mountain if they didn't accept the Torah. If the expectation was to accept the Torah without knowing its contents - which is precisely what Na'aseh V'nishma represented - then what was the greatness of their original voluntary acceptance? The shiur notes that when Hashem offered the Torah to other nations (Esav and Yishmael), He allowed them to ask "What is written in it?" and told them the contents before they declined. This raises the question of why a different standard applied to Bnei Yisrael. Tosafos's answer is presented: even though they said Na'aseh V'nishma, when they would see the great fire at Har Sinai, they might have become afraid and changed their minds, claiming they didn't understand what they were getting into. This would constitute kabbalah b'ta'us (acceptance in error), allowing them to retract. Therefore, Hashem held the mountain over them to prevent any possibility of backing out. The shiur then introduces the Midrash Tanchuma's approach, which wasn't cited by Tosafos. The Midrash distinguishes between Torah shebichtav (Written Torah) and Torah shebe'al peh (Oral Torah), suggesting that Na'aseh V'nishma applied only to the former, while the latter, with its complexities and difficulties, required the coercion of kofel et hahar kegigas. The Ran's interpretation of this Midrash is then explored in detail. The Ran rejects the idea that Na'aseh V'nishma was limited to only Torah shebichtav, insisting it applied to both. Instead, he explains that the fundamental issue is the basis upon which Torah is given to the Jewish people. Na'aseh V'nishma implied that they were choosing to accept Torah and would have it because they agreed to it. Kofel et hahar kegigas established that Torah cannot be optional - it must be imposed as a necessity for existence itself. According to the Ran, Na'aseh V'nishma regarding Torah shebichtav was not truly a kabbalah (acceptance) but a gilui (revelation) of who they already were. The concept "Yisrael v'Oraita v'Kudsha Brich Hu chad hu" (Israel, Torah, and God are one) means that Torah shebichtav is automatically part of Jewish essence and existence. Torah shebe'al peh, however, represents the portion of Torah that requires human creativity and understanding ("lo bashamayim hi"). This aspect needed genuine kabbalah since it wasn't automatically part of their nature. When they said Na'aseh V'nishma regarding Torah shebe'al peh, they were expressing willingness to accept it based on trust, even without knowing its contents. Hashem rejected this voluntary basis and imposed it through kofel et hahar kegigas, establishing that Torah must be heichi (necessary) rather than mikri (incidental). The Ran's fundamental principle is that Torah cannot exist in the world merely because people happen to choose it; it must be an imposed necessity because existence itself depends on Torah's presence in the world.
Shabbos (daf not specified)
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