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Why is wounding prohibited on Shabbos (שבת) - is it about dyeing with blood or taking life? Tosafos (תוספות) critiques Rashi (רש"י)'s dyeing approach, arguing that cases like milah and dam besulim involve no blood improvement yet remain prohibited. The melacha must be netilas neshamah - removing the soul-essence - which allows any constructive purpose, not just blood preservation.
This shiur examines a complex Tosafos (תוספות) in Kesubos 5b that critiques Rashi (רש"י)'s approach to the prohibition of wounding (chabalah) on Shabbos (שבת). The Gemara (גמרא) asks whether blood is stored in packets (mifkad pakod) or connected to the body (chabura mechaber), which affects whether extracting blood from a bride (dam besulim) constitutes forbidden wounding. Tosafos challenges Rashi's position from Shabbos that wounding the eight sheratzim (small creatures) is prohibited because of dyeing (tzivah) - coloring their skin with blood. Tosafos raises several difficulties with this explanation: First, the Gemara in Eilu Treifos states that other sheratzim don't have skin, so there's no dyeing prohibition when blood remains inside, yet one is liable when blood comes out. Second, regarding dam besulim and circumcision (milah), there's no relevant dyeing. Third, Shmuel's view that slaughter doesn't involve dyeing suggests alternative reasoning is needed. The Chasam Sofer defends Rashi by explaining that Rashi only invokes dyeing in specific cases where no other benefit from the blood can be found, like in the case of 'the blood congealed but didn't exit' (nitzra dam af pishlo yatza). Normally, Rashi holds that wounding is prohibited due to 'taking life' (netilas neshamah), and one is only liable when there's some constructive purpose - either needing the blood for a dog or some other benefit. However, when blood doesn't exit the creature, no such benefit exists, forcing Rashi to find the alternative explanation of dyeing. Tosafos argues that this approach is problematic because it requires different explanations for similar cases. In milah and dam besulim, there's also no improvement to the blood itself - it goes to waste - yet these are considered constructive acts. Tosafos concludes that the prohibition must consistently be netilas neshamah (taking life), where the melacha involves removing the soul-essence (dam hu nefesh - blood is the soul) from the person. This allows for various types of constructive purposes, whether benefiting the person or utilizing the blood, without requiring the blood itself to be improved. The fundamental disagreement centers on whether the melacha requires improvement specifically to the blood (Rashi's apparent position) or whether any constructive purpose in the overall act suffices (Tosafos's view). This impacts how we understand cases like ritual circumcision and determining virginity, where the blood serves a purpose even though it isn't preserved or improved.
Kesubos 5b
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