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Does the Torah (תורה)'s requirement of biah for kiddushin take effect at the beginning (tehilas biah) or completion (sof biah) of the act? The shiur develops the fundamental principle that one continuous act cannot be divided into separate legal moments unless explicitly interrupted. This yesod explains the Gemara (גמרא)'s question, the status of a Kohen Gadol's kiddushin, and the machlokes Rishonim on whether one can effect kiddushin through harah alone.
This shiur analyzes the fundamental question in Kiddushin 10a regarding when the act of biah (marital relations) effects kiddushin. The Gemara (גמרא) asks whether tehilas biah (the beginning of the act) or sof biah (the completion) creates the halachic acquisition. Rabbi Zweig presents this as not merely a technical question about timing, but rather a fundamental inquiry into how the Torah (תורה) defines "u'ba'alah" - does it mean the act must be completed, or does completion make the beginning retroactively effective? The shiur establishes a critical yesod: one continuous maaseh (act) cannot be divided into multiple legal moments. Just as one act of tearing on Shabbos (שבת) or one act with an ervah generates only one korban regardless of duration, a single maaseh biah is one legal event. The Gemara's question is whether this single event takes effect at its start (retroactively, once completed) or at its conclusion.
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Kiddushin 10a
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