No community start suggestion yet.
When does a false oath by a witness trigger a korban obligation? The shiur analyzes the fundamental dispute between Rav Acha bar Yaakov and Rav Pappa: is the korban due to causing monetary loss, or due to the insult of denying testimony when obligated to help? This chakira resolves major difficulties in the Gemara (גמרא) and Rambam (רמב"ם) regarding psul eidus d'rabanan and the king's exemption.
The shiur presents a fundamental analysis of the two types of shvua seidus (witness oath) obligations, using the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s formulation as the key to resolving major contradictions in the Gemara (גמרא). The Rambam in Hilchos Shvuos Perek Tes presents two distinct cases: (1) when one is asked to testify and refuses, then swears ignorance of testimony, and (2) when one is directly asked to swear they don't know testimony and denies knowledge in beis din. The Rambam's language indicates these represent two separate halachic foundations for korban obligation. The shiur identifies the machlokes between Rav Acha bar Yaakov and Rav Pappa as centering on the fundamental nature of shvua seidus. According to Rav Acha bar Yaakov, the korban obligation stems from causing monetary loss (hefsid mamon) - the witness's refusal prevented the claimant from recovering money. According to Rav Pappa, however, the obligation is based on a different principle: the witness was obligated to help, and by swearing falsely, didn't merely fail to help but actively hurt the claimant by undermining the legitimacy of his claim. This represents a tremendous insult and injury independent of actual monetary loss.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Yoma 73b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
