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What is the halachic definition of tzroros (pebbles)—is liability based on the animal's action or on the stones themselves as a new mazik? The shiur develops the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s foundational position that tzroros creates liability for the stones as an independent entity, not the animal's direct act. This yesod resolves apparent contradictions in how shinui (deviation) affects liability—whether it reduces payment to a quarter or maintains half-damages—and explains why the Rambam rules you can be liable even when the animal was in reshus harabim.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of Bava Kamma 19a, focusing on the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s understanding of tzroros (liability for pebbles kicked up by an animal) and the principle of shinui (deviation from normal behavior). The discussion addresses fundamental questions about the nature of tortious liability in Jewish law and resolves apparent contradictions between the Rambam and other Rishonim. The shiur begins by presenting the Raavad's difficulty with the Rambam. The Gemara (גמרא) appears to conclude that when an animal kicks (bi'ah) while walking, creating tzroros, this is classified as regel (foot damage), which would exempt the owner in reshus harabim (public domain). Yet the Rambam rules that one can collect damages (tofeis) for the full nezek in such cases. The Rav Magid attempts to resolve this by suggesting the question is whether tzroros with shinui is keren (horn damage, full liability) or regel, creating a safek (doubt) that allows partial collection. However, this approach creates its own difficulties in reading the Rambam's language and structure.
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Bava Kamma 19a
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