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Why does the Torah (תורה) write both "toshav" and "socher" to teach that neither can eat terumah? The Gemara (גמרא)'s principle of "miltasadasi b'kal v'chomer torachuv kasav lo kror" seems puzzling—a socher is already included in a toshav nirtzah. The shiur develops the understanding that both share identical reasoning: pre-existing status as a zar cannot be undone by employment or servitude, distinguishing this from kinyan kesef.
The shiur analyzes Kiddushin 4a's discussion of why toshav and socher cannot eat terumah. The Gemara (גמרא) begins with a dispute about methodology in Biblical interpretation. The first opinion holds that when the Torah (תורה) uses two terms (such as "naarah" and "bogeres" or "toshav" and "socher"), this teaches us how to interpret the words—one word defines the other through the principle of "baal zevu alemel al zev." The second opinion, Abaye's, challenges this, arguing that this methodology only works when both terms represent true, independent halachos, not when one is merely included in the other. The central difficulty is understanding what the Gemara means when it says "miltasadasi b'kal v'chomer torachuv kasav lo kror." If a toshav nirtzah (an eved for forty-nine years) doesn't eat terumah, why would we need a pasuk to teach that a socher (hired worker, or eved for six years) also doesn't eat? This isn't a kal v'chomer—the socher is already completely included in the longer-term toshav. The shiur argues that the problem is even more fundamental: calling this a kal v'chomer makes no sense at all. If someone serving forty-nine years cannot eat, anyone serving fewer years is automatically included.
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Kiddushin 4a
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