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What's the difference between following your personal rebbe versus the rav of your location? Rashi (רש"י) distinguishes between talmidim who must follow their rebbe even when he's lenient, and residents who cannot oppose the local rav's rulings but aren't required to follow them when stricter than necessary.
This shiur analyzes a complex passage in Kesubos 5b that explores the distinction between following one's personal rebbe versus adhering to the authority of the local rav (mar de-asra). The Gemara (גמרא) presents what appears to be a contradiction regarding Rav's position on davar she'ein miskaven (unintentional action), showing him being both lenient and strict in different contexts. Rashi (רש"י)'s commentary provides crucial insight by distinguishing between two types of rabbinic authority. When the Gemara says talmidim must "do like Rav," Rashi explains this refers to students in Rav's yeshiva who are obligated to follow their rebbe's rulings, even when he is lenient (makeel). However, when discussing Shmuel as "rav of the place" (mar de-asra), the obligation is different - residents cannot actively oppose the local authority's rulings, but they are not necessarily required to adopt his stringencies if they prefer to be lenient.
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Kesubos 5b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
