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Can you make a valid shvua to fulfill a mitzvah (מצוה) you're already obligated to do? The shiur develops the Ran's approach that such a shvua creates a din of "bi'yachol divaro"—an obligation to keep one's word—distinct from the shvua itself. The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position introduces a third category: the shvua creates zrizus (enthusiastic commitment), and failure to fulfill it constitutes a shvua shav, not shvua sheker.
This shiur delves into the fundamental question of whether one can make a valid shvua (oath) to fulfill a mitzvah (מצוה) that one is already obligated to perform. The Gemara (גמרא)'s difficulty centers on the principle of "mushba v'omed mei'Har Sinai" (already sworn from Mount Sinai)—since every Jew is already bound by oath to fulfill all mitzvos from the moment of Matan Torah (תורה), how can a subsequent personal oath on the same mitzvah take effect? The shiur examines the Ran's approach, which holds that while the shvua is indeed "chal" (takes effect), it operates through the mechanism of "bi'yachol divaro" (honoring one's word). According to the Ran, this creates a real obligation, though not in the classical sense of shvuas bitui (an oath of utterance). The Ran distinguishes between the formal structure of a shvua as an "official statement" and the practical obligation it creates through the requirement to keep one's word. This explains why the Ran uses the language "neder gadol" interchangeably with "shvua"—both create obligations to honor commitments, though through different legal mechanisms.
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Nedarim 8a
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