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Can a woman set conditions on a man's giving, or a man on a woman's giving? The shiur analyzes the dispute between the Bahag, Rambam (רמב"ם), and Tur on nasan hu v'amar hi (he gave, she said the formula) versus nasan hi v'amar hu (she gave, he said it). Each position turns on whether the passive recipient can impose conditions on the giver's act, and whether shtika k'hoda (silence as consent) applies when the parties' actions and words don't align.
This shiur examines one of the core sugyos in Masechta Kiddushin regarding who must perform the act of giving and who may speak the formula of kiddushin. The Gemara (גמרא) on Kiddushin 5b discusses four possible scenarios: nasan hu v'amar hu (he gave and he said), nasan hu v'amar hi (he gave and she said), nasan hi v'amar hu (she gave and he said), and nasan hi v'amar hi (she gave and she said). The fundamental question is which combinations are valid. Rabbi Zweig begins by presenting a difficulty in the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s formulation. The Rambam rules that nasan hu v'amar hu is not valid, nosan hu v'amar hi is a safek (doubtful case), and nasan hi v'amar hi is also not valid. The question arises: if we already know that nasan hu v'amar hu is invalid, why does the Rambam need to tell us that nasan hi v'amar hi is also invalid? This suggests there might be independent reasons why each case fails, rather than one general principle that invalidates both.
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Kiddushin 5b
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