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Why doesn't kiddushin spread from half a woman to the whole woman, unlike animal consecration where partial consecration makes the entire animal sacred? Tosafot distinguishes between two formulations: 'mekudeshes' invokes spreading like hekdesh, while 'me'oreses' creates kinyan without spreading. This reveals two distinct mechanisms for effectuating marriage.
This shiur provides a comprehensive analysis of Kiddushin 7a, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of why kiddushin cannot spread from half a woman to the whole woman, unlike the principle of hispashtus found in laws of consecrated animals. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining the Gemara's question: if someone attempts to consecrate half a woman in marriage (chatzi isha mekudeshes), why doesn't the kiddushin spread to the entire woman, similar to how consecrating part of an animal (regel shezu olah) makes the entire animal sacred? The Gemara answers that marriage requires the consent of another party (da acheret), unlike animal consecration where the owner acts alone. The shiur explores a fundamental difficulty raised by the Machane Ephraim and other Rishonim: since there is a biblical prohibition against partial marriage (chatzi isha), such kiddushin should not take effect at all. If it doesn't take effect, how can it spread? Rabbi Zweig presents the Machane Ephraim's resolution that the prohibition of chatzi isha only applies when there's no principle of spreading; the Gemara must first determine whether spreading applies before knowing if the prohibition exists.
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Kiddushin 7a
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