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Why doesn't kiddushin spread from half a woman to the whole woman, unlike animal consecration where partial consecration makes the entire animal sacred? Tosafot distinguishes between two formulations: 'mekudeshes' invokes spreading like hekdesh, while 'me'oreses' creates kinyan without spreading. This reveals two distinct mechanisms for effectuating marriage.
This shiur provides a comprehensive analysis of Kiddushin 7a, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of why kiddushin cannot spread from half a woman to the whole woman, unlike the principle of hispashtus found in laws of consecrated animals. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining the Gemara's question: if someone attempts to consecrate half a woman in marriage (chatzi isha mekudeshes), why doesn't the kiddushin spread to the entire woman, similar to how consecrating part of an animal (regel shezu olah) makes the entire animal sacred? The Gemara answers that marriage requires the consent of another party (da acheret), unlike animal consecration where the owner acts alone. The shiur explores a fundamental difficulty raised by the Machane Ephraim and other Rishonim: since there is a biblical prohibition against partial marriage (chatzi isha), such kiddushin should not take effect at all. If it doesn't take effect, how can it spread? Rabbi Zweig presents the Machane Ephraim's resolution that the prohibition of chatzi isha only applies when there's no principle of spreading; the Gemara must first determine whether spreading applies before knowing if the prohibition exists.
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Kiddushin 7a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
