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Why is one liable for slaughter through a shliach on Yom Kippur but not on Shabbos (שבת)? The shiur develops the Rif's position using Mar Zutra's principle that one cannot be more liable through a shliach than oneself. A critical chakira emerges: is the fourfold/fivefold payment (arba'ah v'chamishah) a penalty for the aveirah of geneivah, or compensation for the monetary loss caused by removing the animal from the owner's possession?
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of Bava Kamma 61a, focusing on the Mishna's distinction between slaughtering through a shliach on Yom Kippur versus Shabbos (שבת). The Mishna states that one who steals and slaughters on Yom Kippur is liable to pay arba'ah v'chamishah (fourfold or fivefold payment), whereas one who slaughters on Shabbos through a shliach is exempt. The Gemara (גמרא)'s initial approach suggests this is because of shechitah she'einah ruyah (invalid slaughter), requiring one to hold like Rabbi Yochanan Sandler regarding slaughter on Shabbos. Rabbi Zweig examines the Rif's novel position, which diverges from the straightforward reading of the Gemara. The Rif maintains that the Mishna follows the Tanna Kama (not just Rabbi Meir) and that the exemption on Shabbos is not due to shechitah she'einah ruyah at all. Rather, the Rif applies Mar Zutra's principle: maskif lo Mar Zutra, mi kamidi de-ilu ovid ihu lo mechayav, ovid shlicho mechayav - how can one be liable through a shliach when one would not be liable if performing the act oneself?
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Bava Kamma 61a
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When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
