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When is one liable for damage that began with negligence but ended accidentally? The Gemara (גמרא) on Bava Kamma 21b explores whether techilaso b'pshia v'sofo b'oneis applies when two different agents cause damage—one was subject to negligence, the other to unavoidable accident. The shiur develops competing approaches: does the principle focus on the owner's duty to the damaged object, or on responsibility for the specific mazik?
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Bava Kamma 21b, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of the Mishna's case of a dog or goat that jumped off a roof and broke vessels. The Mishna establishes that if the animal jumped (kafatz), the owner pays nezek shalem (full damages), but if it fell (naflu), the owner is exempt. The Gemara derives from this that we follow the principle of techilaso b'pshia v'sofo b'oneis patur—when something begins with negligence but ends in an unavoidable accident, the owner is exempt. The Gemara then brings a Braisa supporting this reading and proceeds to challenge it. The core question emerges: according to the opinion that holds techilaso b'pshia v'sofo b'oneis is chayav (liable), why should falling exempt the owner? The Gemara answers that the Mishna deals with a case where the vessels were placed flush against the wall (mekarve kelim legabei keiso), such that even if the animal had jumped normally, it would not have broken them. Therefore, there is no pshia (negligence) regarding the damage, and the owner is exempt.
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Bava Kamma 21b
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