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Does kiddushin through bi'ah take effect at the beginning (ha'ara'ah) or completion (gemar bi'ah) of the act? The shiur argues that the Gemara (גמרא)'s question is not about splitting a single ma'aseh in half, but rather: when a complete ma'aseh bi'ah is performed, does the kinyan take effect retroactively from the beginning or only at the end? This framework resolves major difficulties in Tosafos (תוספות) and addresses the machlokes between the Rashba and Rabeinu Tam.
This shiur presents a comprehensive analysis of Kiddushin 10a, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s fundamental question: does kiddushin through bi'ah take effect at the beginning (techilat bi'ah/ha'ara'ah) or completion (gemar bi'ah/sof bi'ah) of the act? Rabbi Zweig develops a novel approach to understanding the entire sugya. The shiur opens with several major difficulties on the Gemara and Rishonim. First, on the Gemara itself: the Gemara asks whether one can be mekadesh through bi'ah when it's forbidden (such as a Kohen Gadol with a be'ulah). The Gemara assumes that normally "kol ha'bo'el da'ato al gemar bi'ah" - when one engages in bi'ah, his intent is for complete bi'ah. But if so, why should there be any question? We already know from issurei arayos that gemar bi'ah is what creates the issur, so why would kiddushin be any different? The Gemara provides no explicit source for why kiddushin might work differently. This represents a fundamental gap in the Gemara's reasoning.
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Kiddushin 10a
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