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Can a gift you must return even be called a gift? The Gemara (גמרא) rules that matana al menas lehachzir (a conditional gift given on the understanding it will be returned) works for trumah and pidyon haben but not for acquisition or kiddushin. The shiur wrestles with fundamental questions: What value does the recipient actually receive, how does this differ from mere borrowing, and why does the Torah (תורה) recognize such a transaction as ownership at all?
This shiur analyzes the complex sugya in Kiddushin 6b concerning matana al menas lehachzir—a gift given conditionally that the recipient must return it to the giver. Rava rules that such a gift does not effectuate a sale (mechira), does not create kiddushin with a woman, and does not work for pidyon haben, but does fulfill the mitzvah (מצוה) of giving trumah to a kohen. The Gemara (גמרא)'s contradictory rulings raise fundamental questions about the nature of this transaction. The most basic question is conceptual: what kind of "gift" is this? The recipient receives an object but must immediately return it. There is no shaveh prutah—no actual benefit or value transferred—since whatever is given must be given back. How can this constitute a kinyan kesef (acquisition through money)? For kiddushin, the woman must receive something of value; here she receives nothing she can use. For mechira, the buyer must transfer value to the seller; here the seller gets back exactly what was given. This seems like sleight of hand rather than a genuine transfer.
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Kiddushin 6b
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