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Does performing a mitzvah (מצוה) require intention to fulfill one's obligation? The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s rulings on shofar and matzah appear contradictory—requiring kavana for shofar yet permitting kafu parsoyim (coercion) for matzah. The shiur develops a two-tier framework: kavana l'shem mitzvah (awareness it's a mitzvah) versus kavana to discharge obligation, resolving both the Magid Mishna's difficulty and the Tur's safek.
This shiur analyzes the fundamental principle of mitzvos tzrichos kavana (whether mitzvos require intention) through the lens of Rosh Hashanah 28a and the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s seemingly contradictory rulings. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses cases where someone blows shofar without proper intention or eats matzah under various circumstances, raising the question of whether the mitzvah (מצוה) is fulfilled. The Rambam rules that one who blows shofar without kavana is not yotzei, suggesting he holds mitzvos tzrichos kavana. However, the Rambam also rules that kafu parsoyim (one coerced to eat matzah) is yotzei. The Magid Mishna struggles with this contradiction: if the Rambam holds mitzvos tzrichos kavana, how can coercion work? His first approach suggests that matzah has sheken nena (inherent fulfillment through the act itself) while shofar does not. His second approach proposes changing the girsa in the Rambam regarding matzah to lo yatza.
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Rosh Hashana 28a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
