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Does performing a mitzvah (מצוה) require intention to fulfill one's obligation? The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s rulings on shofar and matzah appear contradictory—requiring kavana for shofar yet permitting kafu parsoyim (coercion) for matzah. The shiur develops a two-tier framework: kavana l'shem mitzvah (awareness it's a mitzvah) versus kavana to discharge obligation, resolving both the Magid Mishna's difficulty and the Tur's safek.
This shiur analyzes the fundamental principle of mitzvos tzrichos kavana (whether mitzvos require intention) through the lens of Rosh Hashanah 28a and the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s seemingly contradictory rulings. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses cases where someone blows shofar without proper intention or eats matzah under various circumstances, raising the question of whether the mitzvah (מצוה) is fulfilled. The Rambam rules that one who blows shofar without kavana is not yotzei, suggesting he holds mitzvos tzrichos kavana. However, the Rambam also rules that kafu parsoyim (one coerced to eat matzah) is yotzei. The Magid Mishna struggles with this contradiction: if the Rambam holds mitzvos tzrichos kavana, how can coercion work? His first approach suggests that matzah has sheken nena (inherent fulfillment through the act itself) while shofar does not. His second approach proposes changing the girsa in the Rambam regarding matzah to lo yatza.
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Rosh Hashana 28a
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