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Does "mitzvas habin al ha'av" mean a mitzvah (מצוה) the son owes the father (kibud av) or a mitzvah imposed on the father for the son's benefit (bris milah)? The Gemara (גמרא)'s resolution creates a contradiction in the Rambam (רמב"ם): why does bris milah require "lamul es haben" (a "le" berachah for oneself) while pidyon haben uses "al pidyon" (an "al" berachah for another), and why does the timing of shehecheyanu differ between them?
The shiur analyzes Kiddushin 29a, focusing on the Mishna's phrase "kol mitzvas habin al ha'av anashim chayavim v'nashim pturos." The Gemara (גמרא) initially interprets this as referring to mitzvos the son must perform for the father—such as kibud av—and asks why the Mishna says women are exempt when in fact women are obligated in honoring parents. The Gemara's answer redefines the phrase: "mitzvas habin hamuteles al ha'av la'asos bno"—mitzvos concerning the son that are incumbent upon the father to perform, such as bris milah and pidyon haben. Rabbi Zweig identifies a fundamental difficulty in this resolution: if bris milah is truly "mitzvas habin"—a mitzvah (מצוה) belonging to the son rather than the father—why does the Rambam (רמב"ם) call it such? An eight-day-old infant cannot have a mitzvah obligation; he has no din of tzivui. The Gemara's conclusion that bris milah falls under "mitzvas habin" appears to contradict the literal meaning of the words. The shiur proposes that "mitzvas habin" means the mitzvah benefits or creates a tikkun in the son, and the father is obligated to help the son achieve that tikkun.
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Kiddushin 29a
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