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Does "mitzvas habin al ha'av" mean a mitzvah (מצוה) the son owes the father (kibud av) or a mitzvah imposed on the father for the son's benefit (bris milah)? The Gemara (גמרא)'s resolution creates a contradiction in the Rambam (רמב"ם): why does bris milah require "lamul es haben" (a "le" berachah for oneself) while pidyon haben uses "al pidyon" (an "al" berachah for another), and why does the timing of shehecheyanu differ between them?
The shiur analyzes Kiddushin 29a, focusing on the Mishna's phrase "kol mitzvas habin al ha'av anashim chayavim v'nashim pturos." The Gemara (גמרא) initially interprets this as referring to mitzvos the son must perform for the father—such as kibud av—and asks why the Mishna says women are exempt when in fact women are obligated in honoring parents. The Gemara's answer redefines the phrase: "mitzvas habin hamuteles al ha'av la'asos bno"—mitzvos concerning the son that are incumbent upon the father to perform, such as bris milah and pidyon haben. Rabbi Zweig identifies a fundamental difficulty in this resolution: if bris milah is truly "mitzvas habin"—a mitzvah (מצוה) belonging to the son rather than the father—why does the Rambam (רמב"ם) call it such? An eight-day-old infant cannot have a mitzvah obligation; he has no din of tzivui. The Gemara's conclusion that bris milah falls under "mitzvas habin" appears to contradict the literal meaning of the words. The shiur proposes that "mitzvas habin" means the mitzvah benefits or creates a tikkun in the son, and the father is obligated to help the son achieve that tikkun.
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Kiddushin 29a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
