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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) invoke get leyad uveon keechad to solve the problem of mashekansei shekansa baal when putting a get in the wife's chatzer? The shiur develops a fundamental machloket between Rav Yochanan and Reish Lakish: Rav Yochanan treats get as a din in hilchos kinyanim (requiring ownership transfer), while Reish Lakish views it as pure nesina (mere delivery). The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s omission of get leyad uveon keechad in Hilchos Gerushin but inclusion in Hilchos Avadim reveals this distinction.
The shiur opens with the Mishna's ruling that placing a get into the wife's chatzer effects a valid divorce. Rashi (רש"י) explains that normally this shouldn't work due to mashekansei shekansa baal—the husband owns the chatzer through nichsei melog, so the get never leaves his reshus. The Gemara (גמרא) offers two solutions: either the husband was mesalek himself from the chatzer (legally relinquishing his rights), or through the principle of get leyad uveon keechad learned from the laws of eved—that the giving of the get and the transfer of the hand occur simultaneously. The central problem emerges from examining the Rambam (רמב"ם). In Hilchos Avadim (Perek 5, Halacha (הלכה) 3), the Rambam explicitly invokes get leyad uveon keechad when giving a shtar shichrur directly to the eved. Yet in Hilchos Gerushin, when bringing the din of the Mishna about chatzer, the Rambam states simply that placing it in her chatzer divorces her, without mentioning either the requirement that the husband give up his rights to the chatzer or the principle of get leyad uveon keechad. How can the Rambam omit the very reason the Gemara gives for why this works?
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Gittin 77b
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