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Can a man be mekadesh a woman with money he owes her, secured by collateral? Rashi (רש"י) holds a mashkon cannot create an obligation—without pre-existing chov, there's no mashkon. The Ramban (רמב"ן) and Rashba disagree: the mashkon does create chiyuv, but kiddushin fails because mekadesh b'milva doesn't work. Tosfos introduces a third possibility: transferring shavus (ownership value) in the mashkon itself.
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Kiddushin 8a-b concerning whether a man can be mekadesh a woman using a mashkon (collateral) as security for money he commits to give her. The Gemara (גמרא) presents the case of a man who says "be mekudeshes to me with the mana I owe you" while giving her a mashkon to secure that obligation. The woman is not mekudeshes, but the Rishonim debate why. Rashi (רש"י) takes the position that there is fundamentally no chiyuv (obligation) here. According to Rashi, a mashkon can only serve to enforce collection of an already-existing obligation, but cannot create a new obligation. Since the man hasn't actually given her money and isn't truly obligated to give her the mana, there is no chov for the mashkon to secure. The language "hilchos mashkin ein hu shev v'klum she'ein ha-mashkin matanah" indicates that without a pre-existing obligation, the mashkon has no value or legal effect. If someone says "I will give you a present" and provides collateral, they can change their mind—the mashkon creates nothing binding.
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Kiddushin 8a-b
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