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Does kiddushin involve the father selling his daughter, or merely granting consent? The shiur unpacks a fundamental dispute between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) on "ha'av zakai b'bito." Tosafos views the father as possessing ownership rights and setting a purchase price; Rashi sees the father as a guardian whose consent is required but who cannot charge for it.
This shiur explores a foundational disagreement between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) regarding the nature of kiddushin and the father's role. The starting point is the Gemara (גמרא)'s statement "ha'av zakai b'bito b'kesef shtar u'biah" — the father has rights over his daughter regarding kiddushin through money, document, or relations. The core question is what exactly this "zakah" (entitlement) means and what it teaches us about the structure of kiddushin. Tosafos holds that when kiddushin is performed through biah with the father's consent, any money given goes to the father. This position assumes the father actually owns his daughter in some sense and can place a purchase price on her. When someone marries the daughter, he is acquiring an object from the father, and the father is entitled to set terms and collect payment. According to Tosafos, kiddushin is fundamentally a form of sale or kinyan — the groom is buying something from the father. The Gemara's teaching that the father is "zakai" proves there is an ownership element. Without ownership, there would be no basis to obligate payment; one cannot charge for mere consent.
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Kiddushin 3b
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