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When a woman says "give it to me" and a man responds with kiddushin, is she mekudeshes? The answer depends on whether she asked for a matana (gift) or a sale. The Rashba and Ran dispute whether a matana can create a maaseh kiddushin. The Rambam (רמב"ם) reconciles their views: in a sale context, even a single lashon works because she agreed to pay back; in a gift context, only explicit consent creates kiddushin.
This shiur examines a complex sugya in Kiddushin 8b-9a concerning the language used in kiddushin transactions. The Gemara (גמרא) presents cases where a woman says "give it to me" (hava amei) and the man asks "if I give it to you, will you marry me?" followed by the woman repeating "give it to me." The Gemara rules she is ein mekudeshes (not betrothed), but the exact reasoning is disputed among the Rishonim. The Ran explains that two conditions are necessary for ein mekudeshes: both a lashon she'ela (question format) from the man as his last statement, and dibur kama k'samech (her initial statement establishing context). If only one condition exists, she would be mekudeshes. The Rashba disagrees fundamentally, arguing that since the man asked a question and she did not answer affirmatively (even shtika k'hoda'a would require silence, not a response), she remains ein mekudeshes even if he subsequently says "harei at mekudeshes li."
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Kiddushin 8b-9a
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