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Why does the Torah (תורה) exempt a bor owner when a person falls in, while holding him liable for an animal? The shiur examines Tosafos (תוספות)'s difficulty: if the exemption is because the deceased becomes hefker, how does that address the machlokes between Rav and Rav Nachman bar Yitzchok about whether heirs acquire through yerusha? The core tension is whether yerusha creates ownership of the physical body or only the deceased's assets.
This shiur analyzes a complex discussion in Bava Kamma 6a concerning the Torah (תורה)'s exemption of a bor owner when a person dies in the pit, while holding him liable when an animal falls in. The Gemara (גמרא) derives from the pasuk that when an adam dies in a bor, the bor owner is patur (exempt), establishing a fundamental distinction between human and animal victims. Tosafos (תוספות) raises a fundamental question about why this pasuk is necessary. Tosafos suggests that perhaps the pasuk is needed to teach that even in cases of yerusha (inheritance), the bor owner remains exempt. The difficulty arises because yerusha itself is the subject of a machlokes (dispute) in the Gemara between Rav Nachman bar Yitzchok and Rav. According to Rav Nachman bar Yitzchok, yerusha koneh—the heirs acquire ownership. According to Rav, yerusha lo koneh—there is no acquisition through inheritance, and the deceased's property remains hefker (ownerless).
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Bava Kamma 6a
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