No community start suggestion yet.
Why is kiddushin invalid when she gives money and says "harei ani mekudeshes loch" (noson hi v'amra hi)? The shiur develops a fundamental machloket between Tosfos and the Rashba about whether the problem is substantive—that kiddushin requires the man to be active—or merely evidentiary, turning on whether we know his consent. The analysis has major implications for adam chashiv and shtika k'hoda'ah.
This shiur examines a complex sugya in Kiddushin 5b concerning the validity of kiddushin when the woman initiates the transaction. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses "noson hu v'amra hi" (he gives and she says the formula) and "noson hi v'amra hu" (she gives and he says the formula), establishing that certain formulations are invalid while others create a doubt (safek kiddushin). The shiur opens by addressing a question in the poskim: when the Rif rules that noson hu v'amra hi creates only a rabbinic-level safek, while elsewhere the Rif treats similar doubts as Torah (תורה)-level uncertainties requiring stringency, what accounts for the difference? The Ayin HaMishpat suggests that noson hu v'amra hi involves a safek im tziyus (doubt about the reality of the facts—whether his silence indicates consent), whereas other cases involve safek b'din (legal doubt), and these two types of doubt are treated differently regarding chazakah (presumption).
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kiddushin 5b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
