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When a camel carries burning flax into a courtyard and damages property, who pays—the negligent owner or the one who lit the fire? The shiur builds a chakira distinguishing mamon hamazik (property-based liability) from maase adam (direct human action), showing that when fire is eish meshum chitzav, the human actor (chen v'ni) bears exclusive liability; but when fire is eish meshum mamono, liability is shared.
This shiur explores Bava Kamma 22a, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of a camel loaded with burning flax (pishtan) that enters a courtyard and ignites property. The central question is whether the owner of the camel (baal hagamal) or the one who lit the fire (chen v'ni) bears liability, especially in cases involving mesach seches (the camel actively spreading the fire throughout the entire structure) and omda (the camel standing still while the fire spreads). Rabbi Zweig analyzes the dispute between Rav Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding whether fire is eish meshum chitzav (fire as an arrow, a direct extension of human action) or eish meshum mamono (fire as one's property). According to Rav Yochanan, fire is treated as the person's chetz—a direct action—making the chen v'ni the sole actor and thus fully liable. According to Reish Lakish, fire is mamon, creating potential for shared liability when another party intervenes.
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Bava Kamma 22a
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