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If thieves acquire ownership through kim lei d'rav mineh (being liable for death when breaking in), why would they ever owe kefel payments? Tosafot's approach distinguishes between machteret (tunneling) which triggers kim lei, and other theft methods like rooftop entry which require warning first. This preserves kefel liability in most cases while maintaining the death-exempts-payment principle.
This shiur provides an extensive analysis of Gemara (גמרא) Sanhedrin 72a, focusing on the complex interplay between theft, ownership acquisition (kinyan), and payment obligations. The discussion centers on a Tosafot that questions a statement of Rav regarding when a thief becomes exempt from returning stolen goods. The Gemara discusses the principle that when one thief steals from another thief, the second thief does not pay double payment (kefel) to the first thief, since it is considered stealing 'from the house of the thief' rather than 'from the house of the owner.' Rav states that this only applies after the original owner has given up hope (yiush), but before yiush, the first thief has not yet acquired the stolen item and thus the second thief would be liable for kefel.
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Sanhedrin 72a
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