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What makes witnesses "eidim she'eino yachol lehazimam" — witnesses who cannot be contradicted? The shiur examines whether the principle applies because (a) you cannot punish the witnesses, or (b) their testimony lacks precision and is therefore defective. Rashi (רש"י)'s position that hoda'as ba'al din (the litigant's own admission) makes the witnesses' testimony redundant is analyzed, with implications for whether this rule applies only in capital cases or extends to monetary matters.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of the Gemara (גמרא) in Bava Kamma 65b concerning the concept of eidim she'eino yachol lehazimam — witnesses who cannot be subjected to hazamah (impeachment through contradictory testimony). The discussion focuses on understanding the fundamental dispute and resolving several apparent contradictions in the sources. Rabbi Zweig begins by framing three central questions: First, what is the underlying dispute between the chachamim and the dissenting opinion? Second, why does the Gemara state that eidim she'eino yachol lehazimam applies not only in capital cases (dinei nefashos) but also in monetary cases (dinei mamonos), particularly regarding knas (fines), while the Rambam (רמב"ם) limits this principle to capital cases? Third, why don't witnesses receive malkus (lashes) for violating "lo sa'aneh" (bearing false witness) according to Tosafos (תוספות)?
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Bava Kamma 65b
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