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What is the nature of a mashkon (collateral)—does it transfer ownership (shavus) or merely create a right to withhold the object? The shiur works through the fundamental machlokes between the Ri Migash, Rosh, Ramban (רמב"ן), and Rashba on whether meshicha works on mashkon, and when mashkon can create a kiddushin obligation. Tosafos (תוספות)'s two-tier approach is unpacked: a standard mashkon is only a right to withhold (no kiddushin), while "hotzi leih mashkon" transfers the monetary value and can effect kiddushin.
This advanced Gemara (גמרא) shiur delves deeply into the sugya of mashkon (collateral) on Kiddushin 9a, examining when and how a mashkon can create a halachic obligation, particularly in the context of kiddushin. The core question is whether a mashkon given at the time of a loan (b'shaas halaavah) differs fundamentally from one given afterward (shelo b'shaas halaavah), and what precisely is being transferred when a mashkon changes hands. The shiur begins by exploring the asmachta problem: when someone says "I will give you a present," but does not yet have the money, there is insufficient gemirat daas (full intent) to create a binding obligation. The question is whether giving a mashkon on such a promise can create a chiyuv (obligation) despite the lack of gemirat daas. The speaker suggests that even after thirty days or at a theoretical "day of reckoning," if the underlying commitment lacked full intent, the mashkon itself cannot cure that deficiency.
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Kiddushin 9a
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