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Why does a pit (bor) ten tefachim deep create liability for death while a smaller pit does not, yet both create liability for damages? The Gemara (גמרא) and Rambam (רמב"ם) establish that liability for death requires the pit be "motzi" (likely) to kill, whereas liability for damages requires only that the pit be motzi to cause some damage—not necessarily the specific damage that occurred. This creates distinct halachic categories for death versus injury.
This shiur analyzes Bava Kamma 3b, focusing on the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s treatment of bor (pit) liability in Hilchos Nizkei Mamon, perek 12-13. The fundamental question is: what distinguishes liability for an animal's death from liability for its injuries when it falls into a pit? The Rambam (Halacha (הלכה) 10) establishes that a bor must be ten tefachim deep to create liability for death (misah), learned from the pasuk that specifies "bor." A pit of nine tefachim is insufficient—even though it actually killed the animal—because it is not "kedei lehamas" (sufficient depth to kill). The shiur examines Rashi (רש"י)'s two explanations: the first lashon holds that a bor of nine can kill but is not "darko lehamas" (its normal manner to kill), requiring a pasuk to exempt; the second lashon holds that a bor of nine simply doesn't kill at all, making the exemption a matter of svara rather than a special pasuk.
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Bava Kamma 3b
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