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Can a man be mekadesh a woman against his will? The shiur analyzes the Baal HaIttur's position that talui bekoni is passive and thus invalid for kiddushin, contrasting it with the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s view. The central insight: when force means mere non-resistance (talui bezavin zvina zvina), mitzvah (מצוה) lishmah can elevate passivity to active intent, making even coerced kiddushin valid.
This shiur continues an in-depth analysis of the machlokes between the Baal HaIttur, the Rambam (רמב"ם), and the Raiva regarding whether someone acting under duress (baal korcha) can effect a valid kinyan or kiddushin. The core question is whether an act done under pressure is considered "active" or merely "passive," and what implications this has for different types of acquisitions. The Baal HaIttur holds that talui bezavin zvina zvina (when acquisition depends on the seller's will) is inherently passive. Since passivity cannot create a valid hakna'ah (transfer), kinyan kesef done under duress is invalid—because it begins with the buyer taking money, which requires the seller to actively transfer, something a passive person cannot do. By contrast, the Rambam holds that any expression of will, even under duress, is considered active. The Raiva takes a middle position: if the person explicitly says "rotzeh ani" (I want), it's active; without that statement, it remains passive.
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Kiddushin 2b
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