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When is a single witness believed against an established presumption (chazaka)? The Gemara (גמרא) limits eid echad's testimony where there is ischazik isur, but Tosafot develops a critical chakira: does biyodo (the ability to have fixed the situation) strengthen the witness's credibility, or does it weaken the chazaka itself? Three levels of biyodo emerge—from immediate ability, to past opportunity, to likely achievement—each raising fundamental questions about the basis of witness credibility.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental sugya in Gittin 2a concerning the parameters of eid echad (single witness) testimony. The Gemara (גמרא) establishes that while an eid echad is generally believed in certain contexts, there is a limitation: an eid echad is not believed kineged ischazik isur (against an established presumption of prohibition). The question arises: when exactly is a witness believed, and what is the role of "biyodo" (literally "in his hand"—the ability to have rectified the situation)? Rashi (רש"י) brings four examples where eid echad is believed: hafrashas terumah (separating tithes), shechita (ritual slaughter), and nikur hagid vachelev (removing forbidden fats and the sciatic nerve). The Gemara challenges this from the principle that eid echad is not believed kineged ischazik isur. Rashi responds that in some of these cases, the witness is believed because it's "biyodo"—he had the ability to fix the situation himself.
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Gittin 2a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
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Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
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