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What does the father's zakkai (authority) over his daughter's kiddushin mean? The Gemara (גמרא) explores whether it means he can force her into marriage, whether he controls the kiddushin money, or both. Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) debate whether the father's role is consent-based or ownership-based, with major implications for whether the daughter receives the kiddushin kesef when she is a na'arah versus a ketanah.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 3b, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of the father's authority (zakkai) over his daughter's marriage. The central question is what "zakkai bebito bikdushin" means: does it mean the father can marry her off against her will (bal korchah), does it mean he receives the kiddushin money, or both? Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) present fundamentally different approaches. According to Rashi, zakkai initially means the father can force the marriage (bal korchah), and a separate derivation is needed to teach that he also receives the kesef kiddushin. The difficulty with Rashi is that if zakkai means forcing, why does it need a separate limud for the money? Rashi answers that even when forcing is possible, the money could theoretically go to the daughter. The Gemara's question "ein me'alidido" means perhaps the daughter should receive the money even though the father retains consent authority. The answer "as biti nosati" establishes that the father is the baal habayit (owner) of the kiddushin process, and therefore "lo lechinam zikah lakasuf"—it wouldn't make sense for him not to receive the money when he is performing the mitzvah (מצוה) of marrying her off.
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Kiddushin 3b
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