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Why can tashmishei mitzvah (מצוה) be discarded while tashmishei kedusha require genizah? The Gemara (גמרא) on Megillah 26b lists sukkah, lulav, shofar, and tzitzis as tashmishei mitzvah—yet each has korban-like qualities or Torah (תורה)-level kedusha. The shiur explores the tension between the Gemara's permissive ruling and Rishonim who treat these objects with greater sanctity, questioning how we define the boundary between mitzvah-object and sacred-object.
This shiur opens with the fundamental distinction laid down by Chazal: tashmishei mitzvah (מצוה) may be discarded (mizrakin), while tashmishei kedusha require genizah. The Gemara (גמרא) in Megillah 26b provides a list of examples—sukkah, lulav, shofar, and tzitzis—all of which are classified as tashmishei mitzvah. Yet Rabbi Zweig immediately flags a deep problem: each of these items appears to possess qualities that should elevate it to tashmishei kedusha. The tension is sharpened by the position of the Maharal and the Kolbo, who maintain that one should treat these items with the sanctity of tashmishei kedusha—tovol v'bracha—even though the Gemara explicitly permits discarding them. Rabbi Zweig challenges this on principle: if Chazal ruled that it is mutar to discard these items, how can later authorities—even gedolei Torah (תורה)—impose a stricter standard and call it a chumra? What does it mean to say tovol v'bracha when the Gemara itself gave permission? This is not simply about pious stringency; it suggests a conceptual reassessment of what these objects are. The shiur probes whether the Rishonim are indeed contradicting the Gemara or revealing a dimension of kedusha that the plain reading obscures.
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Megillah 26b
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