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What is lishmah—a requirement that witnesses testify something was done "for the sake of" the specific parties, or something else entirely? The shiur develops a foundational yesod: lishmah is not testimony (hagadas eidus) at all, but rather the creative act by which witnesses transform a secular contract into a religious document. This explains why the Rambam (רמב"ם) requires different names in gittin, kiddushin, and shichrur—each document affects a different religious status.
The Gemara (גמרא) on Gittin 3b raises questions about whether lishmah is required for a get according to different Tanna'im. Rav Kivager asks several difficult questions: Why wouldn't eid sh'batlah etzlo batalah kulo apply when one witness signs shelo lishmah? How can we require lishmah if it creates a problem of motzi es hapeh—the husband must say he's divorcing his wife, yet the witness becomes part of that declaration? The Gemara even discusses extremely technical cases like a husband who has two wives named Rochel and wants to divorce one of them. Another major question from Rav Kivager: The Gemara says you don't need kesivah lishmah or chasimah lishmah according to one view. But this should create an eid sh'batlah etzlo batalah kulo problem. Every get has three witnesses—two who sign and the sofer who writes it. If the sofer writes shelo lishmah, shouldn't the entire get be invalidated since one witness is disqualified? Rav Kivager suggests that since shelo lishmah is not a disqualification in the person (pesul haguf) but rather a disqualification in the action, the principle of eid sh'batlah doesn't apply.
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Gittin 3b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
