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Can a statistical majority (rov) permit a yevama to remarry when we don't know if she gave birth? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: rov can say "there is no question" but cannot resolve an actual question. When a woman's status requires testimony (eidim) to change—as in yibum—a rov hatoli b'meisa (majority based on an assumed action) cannot overturn the existing chazaka.
This shiur addresses a fundamental question in Yevamos 36a regarding the interaction between rov (statistical majority), chazaka (presumptive status), and the principle of rov hatoli b'meisa (a rov based on an assumed action that occurred). The case involves a woman whose husband died childless, requiring yibum (levirate marriage) or chalitza. If she was pregnant when he died, after nine months we face a question: did she give birth (making her exempt from yibum), or not? The Gemara (גמרא) initially suggests that rov noshim mesabros v'yoldos (most pregnant women give birth to viable children) should permit her to remarry without chalitza. However, the Gemara rejects this because of a rabbinic decree: if we allowed remarriage based on this rov, and later it turned out there was no child (or the child was not viable), people might mistakenly think that a chalutza (one who underwent chalitza) is permitted to marry a Kohen.
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Yevamos 36a
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