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Can betrothal work through forgiving a debt? Rashi (רש"י)'s position emerges: forgiving the debt itself cannot create betrothal because that's merely money, not a tangible transfer. Only when the man provides a distinct service—such as lobbying to extend payment time or securing debt forgiveness—can the woman be betrothed, since she receives a measurable benefit separate from the loan itself.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 6b, focusing on the complex discussion of whether a man can betroth a woman (be mekadesh) by forgiving a debt (milva) she owes him. The Gemara (גמרא) states: "HaMakadesh b'milvah einu mkudeshus" - one who betroths through a loan is not betrothed, but "v'nos milvah mkudeshus" - and yet there is a form of loan betrothal that works. The question is how to distinguish these cases. Rashi (רש"י)'s foundational insight is that when the Gemara says "hamakadesh b'milvah," it refers to a debt she already owes him ("milvah shel visich"). This means if he lent money to someone else, there might be a property transfer (transferring the lien), but when discharging his own loan to her, there is no actual transfer of property—he's merely removing an obligation. The Gemara's principle is "v'lav midi k'yoiv lo b'shas kedushin"—there must be something of value transferred at the moment of betrothal.
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Kiddushin 6b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
