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When ten people beat a victim and the last one delivers a fatal blow, why is everyone exempt? The shiur contrasts two fundamental approaches: Tosafos (תוספות) and the Yad Ramah view the victim as a treifa (halachically dead), while the Rambam (רמב"ם) and Rashi (רש"י) frame it as shnayim she'asu (joint action). The distinction reshapes the entire understanding of collaborative homicide and exemption from capital punishment.
This shiur offers a comprehensive analysis of Bava Kamma 6a, focusing on the case where ten people strike a victim sequentially and the final blow proves fatal. The central question is why the last striker is exempt from capital punishment. The Gemara (גמרא) presents a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda ben Besaira, who holds that all are exempt (zachor zeh), and the Chachamim, who hold that all are liable (kulam chayavim). The shiur begins by examining Tosafos (תוספות), who distinguishes between cases where each blow is yesh bo kedei lehamis (sufficient to kill) versus ein bo kedei lehamis (insufficient alone to kill). Tosafos argues that when each blow is ein bo kedei lehamis, the final striker is liable even according to the Chachamim, because the victim is not yet a treifa. The Smag and Yad Ramah follow this approach, understanding that the case of kulam patur applies only when each blow is individually fatal—making the victim a treifa after the first blow. According to this view, a goses b'yidei adam (one mortally wounded by human action) has the status of a treifa, and killing him does not constitute a complete act of murder.
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Bava Kamma 6a
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