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Why are witnesses who testify falsely about the kavana (intent) of an accidental killing not subject to the standard rule of eidim zomemim? The shiur analyzes Tosfos' two approaches: either their punishment comes through lo sa'aseh rather than the kazama framework, or they receive the punishment the original party would have gotten (sreifa or chenek depending on circumstances). The discussion explores when kavana requires formal testimony versus when it can be inferred.
This shiur analyzes Tosfos on Yevamos 2a, focusing on the intricate sugya of eidim zomemim (conspiring witnesses) in cases of accidental killing and galus (exile). The central question is why witnesses who falsely testify about someone's kavana (intent) in an accidental killing are not subject to the standard din of eidim zomemim. The Gemara (גמרא) opens with a question: "keitzad ein eidim na'asin zomemim" — how is there a case where witnesses do not become zomemim? The Gemara seems to suggest these witnesses are not subject to kasha zomah, yet the Mishna calls them "eidim zomemim." Tosfos presents two fundamental approaches to resolving this tension.
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Yevamos 2a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
