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Why are witnesses who testify falsely about the kavana (intent) of an accidental killing not subject to the standard rule of eidim zomemim? The shiur analyzes Tosfos' two approaches: either their punishment comes through lo sa'aseh rather than the kazama framework, or they receive the punishment the original party would have gotten (sreifa or chenek depending on circumstances). The discussion explores when kavana requires formal testimony versus when it can be inferred.
This shiur analyzes Tosfos on Yevamos 2a, focusing on the intricate sugya of eidim zomemim (conspiring witnesses) in cases of accidental killing and galus (exile). The central question is why witnesses who falsely testify about someone's kavana (intent) in an accidental killing are not subject to the standard din of eidim zomemim. The Gemara (גמרא) opens with a question: "keitzad ein eidim na'asin zomemim" — how is there a case where witnesses do not become zomemim? The Gemara seems to suggest these witnesses are not subject to kasha zomah, yet the Mishna calls them "eidim zomemim." Tosfos presents two fundamental approaches to resolving this tension.
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Yevamos 2a
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