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Why does a married woman become obligated in honoring parents after divorce when the pasuk exempted her? The shiur analyzes three approaches—Ran, Ritva, and Rambam (רמב"ם)—turning on whether kavod without personal service qualifies as kibbud av or merely ahavta l'reacha kamocha, and whether the exemption is a function of reshus (authority-domain) or practical inability.
The Gemara (גמרא) in Kiddushin discusses the obligation of honoring parents through kavod (honor) and mora (awe/fear). The Gemara establishes that mora includes not contradicting a parent, not sitting in their place, and not joining another to rule against them, while kavod includes providing food, drink, and clothing. The pasuk uses the plural "tira'u," indicating both sons and daughters are obligated, but also states "ish" (a man), which the Gemara interprets to mean a man has the wherewithal to fulfill these obligations while a married woman does not, as she is under the authority of her husband. However, if she is divorced, she returns to being obligated. The Ran's approach is that the fact that a divorced woman becomes obligated proves she was always obligated even when married—she was merely in a state of ones (compulsion) that prevented fulfillment. The Ritva disagrees fundamentally, arguing that when married she was truly exempt, and only the pasuk of "tira'u" creates a new obligation upon divorce. This creates a fundamental question: what exactly was her status when married?
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Kiddushin 30b-31a
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