A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
When someone admits to theft (modeh b'knas) but before witnesses testify, does the admission exempt him only from the original act or also from subsequent court penalties? The shiur develops a fundamental yesod distinguishing two dimensions of knas: chiyuv for the ma'aseh itself versus an onesh (penalty) imposed by beis din. This framework resolves apparent contradictions in the Rambam (רמב"ם) and explains why eidus sh'aina yechola l'hazam (testimony that cannot result in hazama) may be invalid in capital cases but valid in monetary ones.
This shiur presents an extensive analysis of the sugya of modeh b'knas (admission to a penalty offense) on Bava Kamma 65b, focusing on the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s formulation and the fundamental nature of knas obligations. The central question is whether modeh b'knas v'achar kach ba'u eidim (one who admits to a knas violation and then witnesses come) is exempt in all cases or only when he admitted to the principal obligation (chiuv keren). The Rambam in Hilchos Geneivah states that modeh b'knas is patur (exempt) only when the person was modeh b'chiuv atzmo b'keren—when he first admitted to the principal theft obligation before witnesses testified. The question arises: is this principle limited to theft cases, or does it apply to all knas situations? The difficulty is compounded by an apparent contradiction from the Rambam's ruling in Hilchos Shevuos regarding shevuas ha'eidus (oath of testimony) in knas cases, where the Rambam rules that witnesses cannot be obligated in shevuas ha'eidus for knas testimony because the defendant could exempt himself through admission.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Bava Kamma 65b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
