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When can a woman's keli (vessel) in her husband's domain effect kinyan for a get? The Gemara (גמרא) presents competing approaches: one requires actual transfer of the makom (place), another holds that legitimate possession suffices even without being makpid. The shiur explores whether keli shel lokeach reshus moecher works through kinyan chatzer or kinyan possession, with major ramifications for shomrim and gittin.
This shiur analyzes Gittin 77b's discussion of when a keli (vessel) belonging to the lokeach (purchaser) in the reshus (domain) of the moecher (seller) can effect kinyan. The Gemara (גמרא) brings a case where a husband throws a get into his wife's bed. According to Rav, if the bed is in his domain, she is not divorced. Rav Elazar disagrees: her bed, even in his domain, is considered keli shel lokeach bereshus moecher, and she is divorced. The Gemara attempts to prove that keli shel lokeach reshus moecher can effect kinyan. Rashi (רש"י) explains that when the bed is ten tefachim high (gavoa asar), it constitutes a reshus befnei atzmo—an independent domain. The airspace above the bed is not considered part of the husband's reshus. However, the Gemara challenges this with "ikam makam kari lo kafti"—if the legs of the bed touch the ground below ten tefachim, does it lose its status as an independent reshus?
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Gittin 77b
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