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Can kiddushin performed in one location using the dialect of another location be valid? The Mishnah (משנה) Berurah's position that language must match the locale creates a fundamental problem: kiddushin doesn't require formal speech, only mutual understanding and witnesses who comprehend the intent. The shiur explores whether toch k'dei dibur can bridge thought (machshava) and action when dialect obscures meaning.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 6a, focusing on a fundamental question about language and kiddushin raised by the Mishnah (משנה) Berurah in Siman Samach Beis. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses whether saying "harufa" (a term used in Yehuda for betrothal) would create a valid kiddushin outside of Yehuda, such as in the Galil or in Italy, where the term has a different meaning or no meaning at all. The Mishnah Berurah derives from this Gemara that a language only has validity (kashrus) in the place where it is spoken. He applies this principle not only to kiddushin but also to Krias Shema, arguing that one cannot fulfill the obligation of Krias Shema by reciting it in English while in France, since English is not the language of that locale. According to the Mishnah Berurah, language must correspond to the makom (place) where it is being used.
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Kiddushin 6a
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