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Why does a sotah's co-wife (tzara) become forbidden from yibum? The shiur contrasts Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) with the Raavid, developing the chakira of whether "tumah ksiva bakarais" creates a new generic ervah or whether it reflects an issur ishus—a flaw in the original marriage itself. The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s rulings on sotah vadai, sofek sotah, and eishes Kohen she'nessa are analyzed in depth.
This shiur offers a comprehensive treatment of the Talmudic principle of "tzaras sotah"—the status of a sotah's co-wife (tzara) with respect to yibum (levirate marriage)—and explores the underlying mechanics of "tumah ksiva bakarais," a key concept that determines when an issur on one person transfers to another in the context of yibum. The discussion begins with the basic disagreement between the early commentators on Yevamos 11a. Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) learn that the Gemara (גמרא)'s statement "tzaras sotah asura" means that neither the sotah nor her tzara are subject to yibum or chalitzah—they are entirely exempt. The Raavid, however, reads the Gemara differently: "asura" is precise language, indicating that while the sotah and her tzara are forbidden from yibum, they still require chalitzah. This leads to the Rosh's fundamental question: if the Raavid is correct, why does the Gemara pose a contradiction from the Mishna in Sotah, which explicitly states that a sotah requires chalitzah? According to the Raavid, there is no contradiction at all—both sources agree that chalitzah is required.
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Yevamos 11a
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