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Why does the husband need to verbally state "harei at mutteres" when divorcing his wife? The shiur analyzes different approaches from Rishonim—whether it's to ensure the husband knows what he's doing (Ba'al HaMaor), part of the act of sending her away (Ramban (רמב"ן)), or so the wife understands the finality of the divorce (Tosafot). The discussion examines contradictions between different sugyos and explores whether the verbal declaration can be made to an agent.
This shiur presents a detailed analysis of the Mishna on Gittin 78a, which discusses three cases where a get (divorce document) is invalid until the husband says "harei at mutteres" (you are hereby permitted to remarry). The Mishna's structure raises questions about why all three cases are necessary and what each teaches. The shiur identifies two distinct halachos in the Mishna: (1) the get is not valid without the proper declaration, and (2) it can be fixed retroactively by saying "harei zeh gitach" or "harei at mutteres." The progression of the three cases—where he misleads her about what the document is, where she finds it without knowing what it is, and where he places it in her hand while she's sleeping—represents different levels of chiddush for each halacha (הלכה). The order makes sense when viewed from the perspective of which case is a bigger chiddush regarding the invalidity versus which is a bigger chiddush regarding the ability to fix it retroactively.
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Gittin 78a
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