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Why isn't a woman obligated in pidyon haben for her son? The Gemara (גמרא) on Kidushin 29a learns from the double language "tifdeh tifdeh" that whoever is obligated to redeem themselves must redeem others. The analysis explores why the son's obligation when the father fails isn't considered a time-bound mitzvah (מצוה), distinguishing between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות).
This shiur analyzes Kidushin 29a, continuing from the Mishna's statement that the father is obligated in his son's mitzvos. After discussing milah, the Gemara (גמרא) addresses pidyon haben (redemption of the firstborn). The central question is: from where do we know that if the father doesn't redeem his son, the son must redeem himself when he grows up? The Gemara brings the pasuk "tifdeh tifdeh" (you shall surely redeem) to teach that whoever is obligated to redeem themselves is obligated to redeem others, and conversely, whoever is not obligated to redeem themselves is not obligated to redeem others. This excludes women from the obligation to redeem their sons, since women themselves are not obligated in pidyon haben.
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Kidushin 29a
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