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Can a single witness establish a fact against a chazaka, or does eid echad merely remove doubt? The shiur develops the fundamental machloket between Tosfos and Ramban (רמב"ן): Tosfos holds eid echad creates an assumption (sufficient against safek), while Ramban holds it establishes a legal fact (ne'eman even keneged ischazak isur), particularly when one testifies about oneself.
The shiur analyzes the fundamental principle of eid echad ne'eman biIsurin (a single witness is believed regarding prohibited matters) through the lens of a debate between Tosfos and Ramban (רמב"ן) on Gittin 2b. The Gemara (גמרא) learns that eid echad is believed from the case of nidda, where a woman is believed to say she went to the mikvah and is tahor. Tosfos raises a difficulty: how can we learn from nidda to other cases when nidda involves ischazak isur (an established prohibition), since the woman has a chezkas tumah? Tosfos answers with two points according to the Maharsha's understanding: First, the fact that she previously saw blood does not create a chazaka that she is still seeing blood now—there is no ischazak isur regarding current bleeding. Second, regarding her chezkas tumah, it is "beyado lipol" (in her power to remove it) through immersion in the mikvah. Therefore, this case doesn't really involve ischazak isur, and we cannot learn from it that eid echad would be believed against an ischazak isur.
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Gittin 2b
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