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Why does the Rambam (רמב"ם) prohibit selling a Sefer Torah (תורה) for pidyon shvuyim (redeeming captives), despite it being a mitzvah (מצוה) rabah? The shiur develops a yesod: when you can easily obtain money by asking for tzedakah, it's considered "having money," and selling is prohibited. The Rambam's seemingly contradictory rulings in Hilchos Sefer Torah and Hilchos Tefillah reflect a machlokes Tana'im about whether one is obligated to accept the bizayon of begging rather than sell.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental contradiction in the Rambam (רמב"ם) concerning when one may sell a Sefer Torah (תורה). The primary text under discussion is Rambam Hilchos Sefer Torah, specifically Perek Yud Halacha (הלכה) Beis and Perek Yud Alef Halacha Yud Dalet. The Rambam in Perek Yud Halacha Beis states "leolam ein mochrin Sefer Torah ela lishnei devarim" — one may never sell a Sefer Torah except for two purposes: learning Torah or getting married. This formulation appears to exclude pidyon shvuyim (redeeming captives), creating a contradiction with Tosafos (תוספות) and other Rishonim who permit selling for pidyon shvuyim as a mitzvah (מצוה) rabah. Furthermore, in Perek Yud Alef Halacha Yud Dalet, the Rambam writes "ein lochim b'damav ela Sefer Torah acher" — with the proceeds, one need only buy another Sefer Torah — implying one is not obligated to buy another Sefer Torah with the proceeds, which suggests the money could be held for pidyon shvuyim.
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Bava Basra (implied context), Rambam Hilchos Sefer Torah 10:2, 10:14; Hilchos Tefillah 11:14
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