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When a dog takes coals (gachelim) into a grain pile (gadish), does the owner pay for fire damage or animal damage? The shiur works through the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s ruling that distinguishes between putting down the coals (full nezek) and dragging them (chatzi nezek), arguing that dragging creates tzorot, not eish. This explains why the dog owner is only liable for direct damage—not for fire spread—since a regal action cannot create the status of eish mishumechitzo.
This shiur offers a deep analysis of Bava Kamma 22a, focusing on the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s rulings (Hilchos Nizkei Mamon, Perek 2, Halachos 15-16) regarding liability when a dog (kelev) removes burning coals (gachelim) and causes damage. The Gemara (גמרא) and Rambam address two scenarios: when the animal places the coals down in the grain pile (gadish), and when the animal drags the coals through the area. Rabbi Zweig begins by noting the difficulty in the Rambam's formulation. The Rambam states that if the animal places the coals in the gadish (im hinichah be-gadish), the owner is liable for the entire damage to the gadish (nezek shalem). But if the animal was dragging the coals (im hayah megar), the owner pays chatzi nezek only at the place where the coals themselves were (makom ha-gachelim), and is patur on the rest of the gadish that burned. The Raavad challenges this, citing the Gemara's statement that even in the case of dragging, one should be liable for the burning of the gadish.
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Bava Kamma 22a
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