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Can the principle of "matir atzmo b'shechita" (something permitted through slaughter) override muktzeh status? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: matir atzmo b'shechita works only when muktzeh stems from the object's inherent status (muktzeh machmat gufo), not from a lack of preparation (hachana). This resolves tensions between Rav and Shmuel regarding animals standing to give birth and newborn animals on Yom Tov.
This shiur offers an intricate analysis of Beitzah 6a, centering on the principle of "matir atzmo b'shechita" — the concept that when slaughter creates a new heter (permissibility), it can remove muktzeh status. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining a fundamental difficulty: why doesn't the Gemara (גמרא) ask a stronger question from the case of a bechor (firstborn animal) with a mum (blemish), rather than from the case of a treifah? The bechor case seems to present an unanswerable challenge to the principle. The core thesis emerges through a step-by-step analysis of why "behemah omedet l'gadel v'ladas" (an animal standing to give birth) doesn't invoke matir atzmo b'shechita for its offspring. Rabbi Zweig argues that matir atzmo b'shechita can only function when the muktzeh status derives from the object's inherent nature (muktzeh machmat gufo) — such as a treifah being forbidden to eat or a sheretz having no permissible use. In such cases, when slaughter creates a genuine new chefetz (object) with a heter, the historical muktzeh status doesn't carry forward.
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Beitzah 6a
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